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Strategic Gatekeeping: Geopolitical Objectives
and Turkey’s Syrian Refugee Policy

by Maria Zaharatos
Mentored by Dr. Sussan Siavoshi
Abstract
Since the war in Syria began, Turkey has become home to the largest refugee population
in the world, hosting over 3.7 million displaced Syrians. While Turkey initially welcomed them
through an open-door refugee program, its policy has since become more restrictive and
securitized, including threats of forced repatriation. This puzzling shift has been the subject of
some limited scholarship, but there has been no comprehensive analysis of Turkey’s policies,
particularly from a foreign relations perspective. This study attempts to address this paucity by
examining the nexus between foreign and refugee policy, using two case studies. First, because
Turkey had failed to project itself as a regional power in years prior, from 2015-2016 it shifted its
emphasis to relations with the E.U., negotiating a deal with the latter in 2016. Turkey agreed to
adopt an arrangement of restricting refugee movement towards Europe, gaining leverage in its
relations with the E.U. In the second case, from 2016-2021, Turkey has found itself weakened
and defensive in the Syria conflict, which refocused its security goals inward, though it
continued to seek concessions from the E.U. As a result, the country adopted a more securitized
policy with goals of resettlement and repatriation of refugees back to Syria. Both case studies
thus demonstrate the influence of Turkey’s foreign policy on its refugee program, and the latter
period also illustrates how refugee policy might influence foreign affairs.
Funding Source: Mellon Initiative at Trinity University

I.

Introduction
Since the civil war in Syria began a decade ago, the Republic of Turkey (Turkey) has become

home to the largest refugee population in the world, hosting approximately 3.7 million displaced
Syrians1. While, in 2011, Turkey had initially warmly welcomed Syrians through an open-door
refugee program that allowed freedom of movement, its policy has since become more restrictive and
securitized2; in recent years, this trend of securitization has escalated to threats of forced repatriation
and planned resettlements back to still-wartorn Syria3. These puzzling and sudden shifts have been
the subject of some limited scholarship, but there has been no comprehensive analysis of Turkey’s
policies, particularly from a foreign relations perspective. This study attempts to address this paucity
by examining the nexus between foreign and refugee policy. Thus, an essential question arises: what
foreign relations factors might explain Turkey’s policy shift from an open-door refugee program to a
restrictive and nationalist one? This paper will seek to answer this question using two periods as case
studies, namely the periods from 2015 to 2016 and from 2016 to 2021.
In terms of methodology, the case studies examine (a) Turkey’s foreign policy goals during
each period and (b) what refugee policies it adopted. As such, the research will assess the connection
between these factors, drawing from academic research, news, diplomatic sources, and reports.
Findings from this research is significant since Syrian refugees represent one of the largest refugee
and humanitarian crises of our contemporary history. Additionally, Turkey represents a major
geopolitical force that impacts both Europe and the Middle East, and which, as a country of the
Global South, is often under-studied. Lastly, uncovering the nexus of refugee and foreign policy
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deepens our understanding of what factors might motivate the decisions of refugee host states,
helping us to better manage these crises.
II.

Context
A. Turkey’s Geopolitical Standing and the War in Syria
At the turn of the century, Turkey stood at a pivotal point geopolitically. In 1999, Turkey

stood at a pivotal point, as the European Union (E.U.) accepted its candidacy to join the union,
putting the nation on the path to accession for the next decade4. However, when the momentum of the
accession process stalled in the mid-2000s, Turkey began to expand its foreign policy towards
improving relations with the Middle East. It had developed aspirations of becoming a regional
power beyond Western Europe, engaging in broad diplomatic activism in the Middle East and
Eastern Europe5. These foreign relations changes in Turkey are known as neo-ottomanism (as it was
inspired by the former reach and power of the Ottoman Empire), theorized under the foreign policy
doctrine of “zero problems with neighbors” and “strategic depth”. These concepts were formulated
by Turkish foreign policy advisor and, later, minister Ahmet Davutoglu (2002-2009; 2009-2012),
part of the Justice and Development Party or AKP (Turkish acronym) that has held power since their
election in 20026. In terms of relations with Syria, the early 2000s represented a golden age of
Turkey-Syria relations, but quickly came to an end with the start of the Syrian Civil War in 2011,
which Turkish president Erdogan reprimanded before intervening in the conflict as an oppositional
power to Assad’s government, in support of the rebels7. Turkey aimed to establish itself as a
role-model and assertive regional and global power.
B. Defining Refugees in Turkey
When studying migration and asylum in Turkey, it is essential to note that its definition of a
4
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refugee is based in the 1951 Refugee Convention, which originally referred to refugees of World War
II from Europe (limited in time and space). Later, the addition of 1967 Optional Protocol solidified
the global definition of a refugee as “any person who is outside their country of origin and unable or
unwilling to return there or to avail themselves of its protection, owing to well-founded fear of
persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or
political opinion,”8. However, Turkey has not adopted and ratified the Optional Protocol. Thus, as a
result of the 1951 Convention’s geographic limitation, Syrians seeking refugee in Turkey cannot
receive refugee status, rather being considered temporary migrants. For simplicity and clarity, this
paper will refer to the Syrian population in Turkey as refugees..
II. Case Study #1 - 2015-2016: Turkey’s Gatekeeping and the European Migrant Crisis
C. Foreign Policy Objectives
To understand Turkey’s foreign policy goals in the period of 2015-2016 requires closer study
of the aforementioned context. By 2010, Turkey had been making progress towards alignment with
E.U. policies and demands, but its diplomatic activism in the Middle East made certain European
countries uneasy and led to increased tensions9. Progressively becoming disillusioned with the
stalling E.U. accession process in the early 2010s, Turkey had put its focus on solidifying its status as
a regionally assertive power, intervening in the Syrian conflict in 2011, as well as engaging in other
Arab-Spring conflicts in support of the Muslim Brotherhood (in Tunisia and Libya for example)10.
Turkey’s interventionism and miscalculations cost the nation its close relations with its European and
Middle-Eastern allies, and even with the United States, leaving it alienated on the global stage11. By
2015, Turkey was regionally isolated and faced with a conflict-ridden post-Arab Spring environment,
8

Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, E., Loescher, G., Long K. & Sigona N. (2014). The Oxford Handbook of Refugee and Forced
Migration Studies. Oxford University Press. https://play.google.com/books?id=Lp_NAwAAQBAJ
9
Terzi, 2010.
10
Yesilyurt, N. (2017). Explaining Miscalculation and Maladaptation in Turkish Foreign Policy towards the Middle
East during the Arab Uprisings: A Neoclassical Realist Perspective. All Azimuth: A Journal of Foreign Policy and
Peace 6(2): 65–83. DOI: 10.20991/allazimuth.310151
11
Cagaptay, S. (2019). The Syrian Disaster. In Erdogan’s Empire: Turkey and the Politics of the Middle East (p.
111-). Bloomsbury Publishing. https://play.google.com/books?id=zOCrDwAAQBAJ.

which influenced it to turn back towards Europe and Eurasia more generally12.
Thus, one of Turkey's primary foreign policy objectives in the 2015-2016 period was to
reinvigorate relations with the E.U. Through diplomacy, Turkey tried to achieve this objective and
express a renewed commitment to E.U.-Turkey relations. Analysis of Turkish high-level diplomatic
visits from 2009 to 2016 demonstrates that, while Turkey had made increasing diplomatic overtures
towards other regions like Asia, Africa, the Middle East, and the Balkans, its diplomatic activism
towards Western Europe still dominated, in addition to commitments to the U.N. and NATO13.
Publications by the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs have also emphasized the importance of a
relationship with the West and of Turkey’s commitment to accession14, despite hostility that has
limited avenues for cooperation. The 2015-2016 refugee crisis, however, presented opportunities for
renewed cooperation, albeit with alternative modes of partnership and integration15. Though
accession to the Union remains a primary goal for Turkey, scholars have argued that the handling of
the refugee crisis during this period indicates that its relationship with the E.U. is primarily
functional, with integration and cooperation based mainly on economics, monetary policy, security,
and research and development16. This pragmatic approach to foreign relations can also be seen in
Turkey’s approach to cooperation on the refugee crisis.
D. Adapted Refugee Policy
The 2016 refugee deal between Turkey and the E.U. illustrates how Turkey instrumentalized
its refugee policy to achieve its foreign relations goal of rapprochement with the E.U. In late 2015,
E.U. countries, particularly Italy and Greece, became flooded by an influx of over a million refugees,
12
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using deadly and dangerous routes crossing either through the Mediterranean or overland through
Turkey. In response to this management and humanitarian crisis, the two parties came up with the
Joint Action Plan (JAP) in which Turkey agreed to improve its protections of Syrians and to reinforce
coordinated border control, stemming the influx of irregular Syrian migrants into the E.U17. In
exchange for these benefits, the E.U. provided humanitarian and financial assistance for the Facility
for Refugees in Turkey, including a sum of 6 billion euros. In addition, it agreed to open accession
negotiations on Chapter 17 on Economic and Monetary Policy. In 2016, the parties also signed the
Readmission Agreement of which the key principle is: for every Syrian readmitted into Turkey after
illegal entry in the E.U., another will be legally resettled in the E.U. During these high-level political
dialogues, in addition to issues pertaining to the migration crisis, the two parties also discussed
partnerships in energy as well as joint commitment to the fight against terrorism18. For example,
accelerating visa liberalization procedures for Turkish citizens seeking entry into the E.U. and
upgrading the customs union were also a part of the legislation, serving to re-energize Turkey’s
convergence towards the benefits of E.U membership19.
On one hand, these cooperative agreements demonstrated Turkey’s key role in E.U. security
and stability, cementing its regional importance20. On the other hand, the JAP and Readmission
Agreement illustrate how Turkey was able to use its geostrategic position as a gatekeeper to
Europe—playing a pivotal role in the passage (or not) of a massive influx of Syrian
asylum-seekers—in order to gain concessions regarding the accession process. Turkey used this
refugee crisis as a political opportunity to bargain with the E.U., who desperately wanted to limit the
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number of refugees entering the bloc. Tsourapas describes how states of the Global South, who often
host the majority of refugee populations despite having lesser resources, can use a rent-seeking
strategy in order to gain forms of external income or benefits from keeping refugee populations
within their borders, as Turkey did in the 2016 deal21. Turkey used a blackmailing strategy where it
threatened to allow refugees’ illegal passage through Turkey into the E.U.22 Thus, as a result of its
objective of reinvigorating E.U.-Turkey relations—more specifically, regaining the functional
benefits of their partnership—Turkey adapted its refugee policy to be more restrictive.
Additionally, Turkey’s foreign policy goal also relates to its adherence to and convergence
towards E.U. norms and policies. From a legal and humanitarian perspective, E.U. norms demand
high standards for treatment and conditions of refugee populations, ensuring fundamental legal rights
and protections. However, in the 2015 migrant crisis, where the JAP and Readmission Agreement as
a response, it became clear that, in the E.U., security concerns prevailed over the normative rhetoric
of solidarity and protection23. In essence, these deals represent a form of externalized migration and
border control, placing a majority of the burden on Turkey24. The European Union, like much of the
Global North, has been part of an increasing trend of securitization in the past decades, which
contradicts with traditional E.U. norms25. As such, though Turkey had adhered to many of the E.U.
norms on migration and refugees in the past, such as adopting the 2013-2014 Law on Foreigners and
International Protection, in 2015, it chose to adapt accordingly to the E.U. increasing demands for

21

Tsourapas, G. (2019). The Syrian Refugee Crisis and Foreign Policy Decision-Making in Jordan, Lebanon, and
Turkey. Journal of Global Security Studies 4(4): 464–81. 10.1093/jogss/ogz016
22
Tsourapas, 2019.
23
Gürkan, S. & Coman, R. (2021). The EU–Turkey Deal in the 2015 “Refugee Crisis”: When Intergovernmentalism
Cast a Shadow on the EU’s Normative Power. Acta Politica: International Journal of Political Science, 56(2): 276.
DOI: 10.1057/s41269-020-00184-2
24
Dogachan D. (2018). Eu’s Refugee Crisis: From Supra-Nationalism to Nationalism? Journal of Liberty and
International Affairs (JLIA), 3(3), 9-19.
http://libproxy.trinity.edu/login?url=https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&AuthType=cookie,ip,uid&
db=edsdoj&AN=edsdoj.8375a72716124c10be58f161d405c9c5&site=eds-live
25
Fiddian-Qasmiyeh et al, 2014.

securitization26. Furthermore, it is arguably the high politicization of migration in the E.U. that made
Turkey’s political opportunism possible, as the 2016 deal was based in E.U. fears allowing Turkey to
obtain benefits27. Finally, it is clear that this deal reflects a push for securitization on behalf of the
E.U. as the 2016 deal with Turkey was in fact used as a template for other deals such as between Italy
and Libya and Spain and Morocco28.
Though Turkey seems to have formulated its refugee protocol in 2015-2016 based on its goal
of a rapprochement with the E.U., the outcome of its efforts is nuanced. Turkey did engage in close
cooperation and dialogue with the E.U. in order to manage this crisis, signing onto two joint
agreements. In many ways, Turkey envisioned the deal as a new page for cooperation and improved
relations; however, the behavior of these actors ultimately left a bad taste in the mouths of both
parties29. Firstly, Turkey leveraged its gatekeeping power through strategic bargaining, which
alienated the E.U. as it perceived Turkey as an untrustworthy power. Secondly, the E.U. nations
appeared hypocritical to Turkey as they were reluctant to commit to burden-sharing (physically and
financially) or the norms that they have promoted for decades30. As such, rapprochement seems to
have not been very successful and cooperation has remained limited to functionalism.
III.

Case Study #2 - 2016-2021: Syrian Refugees and Turkey’s Nationalist Foreign Policy
A. Foreign Policy Objectives
In the next case study period from 2016-2021, Turkey maintained an objective of
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E.U.-Turkey relations, but its foreign affairs have also been motivated by security concerns in regards
to the conflict in Syria. Relations with the E.U. were subject to the terms of the previously discussed
2016 deal, but have seen ever-increasing tensions. As previously noted, Turkey became frustrated at
the E.U., who failed to fulfill parts of the agreement including lifting visa restrictions, continuing
accession talks, and establishing equitable burden-sharing and disbursing funds31. Implementation of
the 1:1 principle of the Readmission Agreement of refugees entering Greece from Turkey has also
been limited32. Additionally, the E.U.’s mistrust of Turkey has grown due to the nation’s continued
use of a blackmailing strategy. Nevertheless, Turkey’s official rhetoric has maintained its
commitment to positive relations with the E.U. and even has hopes to renew and update the deal to
include increased financial aid and support33. As such, continued cooperation on border security and
the migrant crisis is a major objective for Turkish foreign policy. Through partnership on these
issues, Turkey can ensure funding for its extensive refugee population, which can placate some of its
domestic concerns regarding integration. During this period, Turkey has seen the development of a
nationalist backlash against the West and international law and governance, which can also have a
negative effect on refugees: for example, one study found that, in 2020, 80% of Turkish citizens
surveyed opposed accepting additional refugees34. After the coup against president Erdogan in 2016,
Turkey has seen increased political insecurity and concerns about whether or not the AKP will
remain in power. Faced with these uncertainties, Erdogan has been likely to use an aggressive foreign
policy approach as a rally-the-flag strategy to preserve his electoral support35. While this paper seeks
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to understand the nexus of foreign and refugee policy, it should be noted that domestic concerns can
also influence and explain foreign affairs objectives.
As a result, another key goal of Turkish foreign policy from 2016 to 2021 has been to
stabilize the situation in Syria to avoid additional influxes of refugees. 2016 represented a
tremendous turning point in the Syrian War, with Russia entering the conflict and changing the
balance of power to favor Assad’s dictatorship, weakening Turkey. These changes in power dynamics
have led to Turkey adopting a more securitized and defensive approach, strategically repositioning
itself in Syria: its primary goals have been countering what it considers to be the Kurdish threat,
while letting Assad keep his majority control36. For example, in 2018, Turkey signed a de-escalation
agreement with Russia and Iran regarding the situation in Syria, fearing security threats and
spillover37. This foreign policy objective is also illustrated by Turkey’s addition of defensive troops to
the Syrian city of Idlib in 2020, hoping to prevent Assad’s forces from overrunning the enclave of
rebel control and triggering another refugee crisis38. Increased terror attacks from ISIS at home have
also led Turkey to perceive open migration as a threat to internal security, which adds to the
pre-existing Turkish concerns of terrorism on behalf of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), whose
separatism is perceived as threatening to Turkish identity. Turkey considers the various Kurdish
fighter groups and militias in Syria as security threats—despite them also being allied with the
rebels—and has historically conducted transnational military actions that target Kurdish forces or
populations39. Thus, the second part of their objective in Syria is to ensure that these forces do not
establish a Kurdish state.
B. Adapted Refugee Policy
Two refugee policies that Turkey has adopted in the period from 2016-2021, securitization
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and resettlement & repatriation, demonstrate a clear link to the nation’s foreign relations objectives.
First, securitization refers to the increased border control, limitation of refugee status and protections,
and limits to freedom of movement that Syrians experience in Turkey. In terms of securitization, the
E.U.-Turkey deal in the previous period played a key role in this trend. Furthermore, Turkey has
continued to pursue its foreign policy goals by using refugees as pawns to exert diplomatic pressure
in this securitized landscape. During the conception of the deal and following its implementation,
Turkey continued to threaten the E.U. with the idea of opening the gates. For example in 2020,
Turkey, frustrated with the E.U. 's lack of concessions, threatened a reopening of migration routes
that would have led to thousands refugees fleeing towards Europe40. This has led to multiple
maritime disputes around migration between Turkey and Greece, further slowing accession
prospects41. While Turkey continues to try to gain concessions and become closer to the E.U., it is
clear that its relationships with its E.U. neighbors pose a barrier to future accession possibilities. Like
with the souring relations in the Middle East, the deterioration of Turkey-E.U. relations provides
mounting evidence to the idea that the Turkish foreign policy doctrines of “zero problems” and
“strategic depth” have failed, causing Turkey to turn inward. Turning inward has narrowed its foreign
policy down towards a more securitized and defensive approach, illustrated by its refugee policies.
Turkey’s focus on security has led to a more nationalist-oriented refugee policy, adding return
discourse and repatriation to an already securitized environment. From the Turkish state’s
perspective, the Syrian conflict has allowed for multiple threats to develop against Turkey, including
the rising possibility of a Kurdish state at its border with Syria (which would be a potential ally of
Turkey’s domestic terrorist group, the PKK) and the threats of violent extremism by ISIS. As such,
since 2016, Turkey has established more restrictive border controls and limits to the freedoms of
refugees. Furthermore, because Turkey has no plans to secure Syrians’ legal status as refugees under
40
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the 1961 Optional Protocol, these asylum seekers remain temporary migrants, which limits their
rights and protections under Turkish law. A report from 2020 details the following conditions: limited
access to health, education, and mobility (due to movement restrictions, walls), as well as a
precarious place in the labor market (working in the informal sector and lacking work permits)42.
Surveillance has also greatly increased, which serves as a refugee security measure, but also one
regarding the security threat of terrorism43. In 2019, Turkish police was reported conducting
roundups and ID checks, intimidating and threatening Syrians with deportations44.
In a drastic shift from its previously welcoming policy, in recent years Turkey has been
accused of deporting thousands of Syrian refugees as part of its repatriation and resettlement plan45.
The border crossing department of Bab Al-Hawa reports that in the month of November 2021 alone,
964 Syrian refugees were deported by Turkish authorities46. Under the Refugee Convention,
repatriation is defined as voluntary return to one’s country of origin, with the right be return being
protected47. In the case of Turkey’s actions, it is unclear and unconvincing whether most of these
returns have been voluntary, challenging its legality. However, due to the technicality in which it does
not consider Syrians as refugees, Turkey seems to have escaped accountability for these deportations.
Furthermore, in 2019, Turkey announced its intentions to repatriate and resettle one million refugees
in Syrian border territories; to make return possible, Turkey has planned to create extensive
infrastructure and redevelopment projects, creating so-called safe-zones at its borders, which it
controls with the US and Kurdish forces48. These projects have led to military incursions into
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Northern Syria, already making space for the resettlement of about 61,000 Syrians as of 202049. In
2021, the Syrian Observer reported progress on these developments, with 50,000 of a planned
100,000 housing units already constructed in these zones50.
While these safe zones do have a clear purpose in Turkey’s approach to refugee management,
they are also instrumental in its foreign policy, serving as buffer zones to the Kurdish forces and
preventing additional territorial gain for the Kurds that could lead to an independent state51. For
example, the Euphrates Shield Operation that secured these safe-zones was supplemented through
Operation Olive Branch, which effectively rid the areas of YPG (Kurdish) control52. Prioritizing its
foreign affairs and refugee policy gains, Turkey continues to push a repatriation agenda, though
return currently remains a non-viable option that is neither safe nor sustainable53. Local and global
non-governmental organizations and agencies have accused Turkey of advancing demographic
change in Northern Syria through its settlement project, while Erdogan maintains this is a humane
and humanitarian approach in favor of the refugees54. Finally, despite being faced with pushback
from these agencies and some Western nations, Turkey’s gatekeeping leverage has allowed it to move
forward with resettlement and repatriation plans and to continue to exert diplomatic pressure on the
E.U.
IV. Conclusion
The exploration of these case studies demonstrates how, over the period of 2015-2016,
Turkey’s refugee policy has been observably shaped by its foreign relations objectives, while over the
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period of 2016-2021, both Turkey’s refugee protocols and its foreign policy seem to have influenced
each other. More research is needed to establish direct causational links, but this paper demonstrates
the correlation of and provides a strong argument for a multidimensional link between foreign policy
and refugee protocols. Further research would also allow for a greater understanding of the
contemporary and future policies in Turkey, which presumably will see long-term impacts from the
COVID-19 pandemic and other challenges the country faces. What can already be noted is that
Turkey seems to have reached its maximum capacity as a refugee host state, its immense refugee
population leading to escalating societal tensions and high integration costs55. Without an updated
deal, Turkey has indicated that it is unwilling to support its refugee population, or any more
arrivals56. Furthermore, the policies in the last decade have been shaped by Erdogan and the AKP
party, both of which seem to be on their way out due to political threats and an economic downturn
bolstered by the pandemic; as such, Turkey may turn to opposition parties, which favor an even
stronger nationalist refugee protocol based in deportations and have argued for normalizing relations
with Assad57. This trend of seeking normalization with Assad’s regime, at the detriment of Syrian
refugees, can also be seen in various E.U. countries (though the official foreign relations position
remains denouncing the dictatorial regime)58. As such, if Turkey chooses to maintain alignment with
E.U. positions, it may pursue further securitization in an updated deal.
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